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Recent Decisions
It is believed that the Court in Lindsey, by failing to even acknowl-
edge the critical and complex issues inherent in an urban leasehold, as
exemplified by the discussion in Javins28 and other cases, has stalled, at
least in the absence of express legislative approval 2 9 any continued
trend toward equalization of power between tenant and landlord.A0
C. Timothy Shafjer
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION-The United States
Supreme Court has held that the first and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution of the United States prevent a state from compelling
Amish children to attend formal high school to age sixteen.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller and Adin Yutzy, the respondents, are
members of the Old Order Amish religion and the Conservative Amish
Mennonite Church. They were charged, tried, and convicted of vio-
lating Wisconsin's compulsory attendance law' and fined the sum of
28. The majority did not cite Javins.
29. The Court recognized the diverse treatment landlord-tenant law enjoys in variousjurisdictions and that a state can legislatively provide for the withholding of rental pay-
ments by the tenant. Id. at 68-69.
30. By ignoring Javins, new impetus has been given to case results that are inapposite
to twentieth century urban America. See, e.g., McKey v. Fairbairn, 345 F.2d 739, (D.D.C.
1965). The court noted that in the absence of a promise to make repairs, the landlord
was not bound to repair a roof, the leakage of which caused a visitor in tenant's home to
fall and be injured. Id. at 742. The court quoted with approval from Security Savings
& Commercial Bank v. Sullivan, 261 F. 461 (D.D.C. 1919):
It is settled law that where the owner of premises, by lease, parts with the entire
possession and control of the premises, and the tenant, either by express provision of
the lease or by the silence of the lease on that subject, assumes liability for the keep-
ing of the premises in proper repair, the tenant, and not the owner, will be liable
in causes of an accident due to negligence in allowing the premises, or any portion
thereof, to get out of repair.
Id. at 120, 261 F. at 462. See also Foster v. United States, 214 F. Supp. 181 (S.D. Miss.
1963); 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 905 (1939); Annot., 150 A.L.R. 1373-84 (1944).
1. WIs. STAT. § 118.15 (1969) provides in pertinent part:
118.15 Compulsory school attendance
(1)(a) Unless the child has a legal excuse or has graduated from high school, any
person having under his control a child who is between the ages of 7 and 16 yearn
shall cause such child to attend school regularly during the full period and hours,
religious holidays excepted, that the public or private school in which such child
should be enrolled is in session until the end of the school term, quarter or semes-
ter of the school year in which he becomes 16 years of age.
(3) This section does not apply to any child who is not in proper physical or men-
tal condition to attend school, to any child exempted for good cause by the school
board of the district in which the child resides or to any child who has completed
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five dollars each. The respondents claimed that the application of the
compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the first and
fourteenth amendments.2 The trial testimony showed that respondents
sincerely believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish
Communities generally, that high school attendance, public or private,
was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that
by sending their children to high school, thereby complying with the
law, they would endanger their own salvation and that of their chil-
dren. The state stipulated that respondents had sincere religious be-
liefs.
The trial court determined that the Wisconsin compulsory school
attendance law3 interfered with "the freedom of the defendants to act
in accordance with their sincere religious belief."'4 It also concluded
that high school attendance until age sixteen as required by statute
was a "reasonable and constitutional" exercise of governmental power,
and therefore denied the motion to dismiss the charges. 5 The Wis-
consin circuit court affirmed respondents' convictions. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court, however, reversed6 the convictions by sustaining re-
spondents' rights under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment.7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari8 to consider
whether the Wisconsin compulsory school attendance law9 violated re-
the full 4-year high school course. The certificate of a reputable physician in general
practice shall be sufficient proof that a child is unable to attend school.
(4) Instruction during the required period elsewhere than at school may be substi-
tuted for school attendance. Such instruction must be approved by the department
as substantially equivalent to instruction given to children of like ages in the public
or private schools where such children reside.
(5) Whoever violates this section .. .may be fined not less than $5 nor more than
$50 or imprisoned not more than 3 months or both.
2. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof .. ..
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
• ..No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. WIs. STAT. § 118.15 (1969).
4. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972).
5. Id.
6. State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971).
A majority of the Court was of the opinion that the State had failed to make an
adequate showing that its interest in "establishing and maintaining an educational
system overrides the defendants' right to the free exercise of the religion."
406 U.S. at 213.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 430, 182 N.W.2d 539, cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994
(1971).
9. Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1969).
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spondents' rights under the free exercise clause of the first amend-
ment ° made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment."
Chief Justice Burger speaking for the majority said that "a State's
interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally
free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental
rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the free
exercise clause of the first amendment and the traditional interest
of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children
.... -12 The Court said that the only way the state could compel
school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such
attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief
is to show that the state does not deny the free exercise of religious
belief by its requirement or that there is a sufficient state interest to
override the interest claiming protection under the free exercise
clause. 13 The Court reasoned that, "only the interest of the highest
order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims
to the free exercise of religion."' 4
The dissenting opinion," written by Justice Douglas, had no argu-
ment against the religious scruples of the Amish opposing formal edu-
cation of their children beyond the eighth grade, but disagreed with
the Court's conclusion that the parents have complete control over
the matter.'6 The dissent stated that the majority's analysis assumed
that there are only two interests at stake-those of the Amish parents
and those of the state. 1T Justice Douglas had difficulty with this ap-
proach because the parents were seeking to vindicate not only their
own free exercise claims, but also those of their high-school-age chil-
dren. He felt that since the children had no other effective forum,
their rights should be considered in this litigation.'
The majority stated, however, that the children were not parties in
this litigation. Therefore, there was no reason to consider the issue.
The parents are the ones subject to prosecution for not sending their
children to school and "it is their right of free exercise, not that of
10. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
11. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. 406 U.S. at 214.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 215.
15. 406 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 242.
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their children, that must determine Wisconsin's power to impose crim-
inal penalties on the parent."'19
As early as 1878, the United States Supreme Court was faced with
the problem of balancing inidividual rights under the religious clauses
of the first amendment against the states' interest in the welfare and
safety of the public. 20 At that time the Court made a distinction be-
tween religious beliefs and religious practices. It was not until 1940
in Cantwell v. Connecticut21 that the Court abandoned this distinction.
Justice Roberts speaking for the majority in Cantwell noted that the
first amendment Religious Clauses embrace two concepts-"freedom
to believe and freedom to act. ' 22 He felt freedom to believe is absolute,
but freedom to act is not. In order to protect society, conduct is sub-
ject to regulations. 23 Justice Roberts believed that the freedom to act
must be so well-defined that the power to regulate it is not overexer-
cised and thus an infringement on the protected freedom. 24
The Court has not accepted challenges under the free exercise
clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts grounded in
religious beliefs, for "even when the action is in accord with one's
religious convictions, it is not totally free from legislative restrictions. ' 25
19. Id. at 230.
20. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). Reynolds was statutorily indicted for
bigamy. The Court held that a religious belief will not be accepted as a justification of an
overt act made criminal by the law of the land.
To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior
to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto
himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.
Id. at 250.
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). The respondents on a public street
induced individuals to listen to recordings which verbally attacked the religious de-
nomination of the listeners. The Court held that:
A state statute which forbids any person to solicit money or valuables for any alleged
religious cause, unless a certificate therefor shall first have been procured from a
designated official, who is required to determine whether such cause is a religious
one and who may withhold his approval if he determines that it is not, is a previous
restraint upon the free exercise of religion and a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 304.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961). Jewish appellants claimed that the
1959 Pennsylvania statute which forbade the retail sale on Sundays of clothing and
home furnishings violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
constituted a law respecting an establishment of religion by imposing serious economic
,disadvantages upon them if they adhere to the observance of their Sabbath. Appellants
claimed that the statute operated so as to hinder the Orthodox Jewish Faith in gaining
new members. The Court said that the statute does not prohibit the free exercise of ap-
pellants' religion within the meaning of the first amendment made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment.
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However, the Court in Sherbert v. Verner,26 noted that "the door of
the free exercise clause stands tightly closed against any governmental
regulation of religious beliefs." 27 The government cannot force affir-
mation of a repugnant belief;2 nor can the government compel a flag
salute by public school children whose religious scruples forbid it;2
nor can the government use its taxing power to inhibit the practice of
certain religious views.80
In 1963, the Court in Sherbert broadened free exercise coverage by
laying down specific factors to be considered in the process of weigh-
ing and balancing the individual's religious freedom interest on the
one hand against the state's public interest on the other. In weighing
the individual's interest, Sherbert8 l requires the court to consider three
elements: the sincerity of the individual's belief; the importance of the
activities for which the exemption is claimed in maintaining the be-
liefs and practices of the individual; and the burden the regulation
would impose on the individual's ability to exercise his religion.8 2 In
weighing the state's interest, the court must consider whether it is a
compelling interest measured in light of the state's concern for uni-
formity in law enforcement, and the state's interest in prohibiting the
establishment of religion. The Court in Sherbert8 also increased the
burden on the state in justifying infringements on religious activities.
The significance of the Supreme Court decision in Yoder is twofold.
First, the Court applied the balancing of interest test called for in Sher-
bert v. Verner 4.to arrive at its decision. Second, the Court added the
new dimension of looking to the historical development and success
of a religious sect in deciding religious liberty cases.
Considering respondents' sincerity of belief and the importance of
the activities for which the exemption was claimed in maintaining their
26. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Appellant, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church,
was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday,
her Sabbath. She filed a claim for unemployment under the South Carolina Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act which makes a claimant ineligible for benefits if he without
good cause fails to accept work offered. The State Employment Security Commission denied
appellant benefits under this provision. The Court held that the statute as applied abridged
appellant's right to the free exercise of her religion, in violation of the first amendment,
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 410.
27. Id. at 402.
28. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
29, West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
30. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
31. 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963).
32. Id. at 404.
33, Id. at 407.
34. Id. at 403-04.
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religious beliefs and practices, the Court concluded, from reviewing
the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and
religious history of the Old Order Amish mode of life,35 that respon-
dents' claims were rooted in religious belief.36 The Court also con-
cluded that to enforce Wisconsin's compulsory education law37 would
greatly endanger and possibly destroy the free exercise of respondents'
religious beliefs.38
In considering the state's interest, the Court would not accept Wis-
consin's broad contention that there was a compelling state interest.
Applying the standards set out in Sherbert,9 Chief Justice Burger
stated that "we must searchingly examine the interests-which the state
seeks to promote by its requirements for compulsory education to age
sixteen, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed Amish exemption."40
The two arguments advanced by the state in support of its system
of compulsory education were that to preserve freedom and indepen-
dence citizens must be able to participate effectively in society and that
this can only be accomplished by having a certain amount of education.
The state argued that respondents' position fosters "ignorance" from
which the child must be protected by the state.41 Responding to these
contentions, the Court relied once more on the unchallenged expert
testimony42 and found that the Amish mode of education-formal
education to the eighth grade and informal education beyond the
eighth grade (leaming-by-doing)-is sufficient in preparing Amish chil-
dren to participate in Amish society and in the general society should
they decide to leave the Amish religion.4" The Court commented that
the state incorrectly assumed that the Amish were "fostering igno-
rance" and turned to the record showing that the Amish Community
has been a highly successful social unit within the general society, even
if apart from the conventional "mainstream." 4'
35. See generally J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIETY (1968); J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGTON,
CHILDREN IN AMISH SOCIETY (1971); Littell, Sectarian Protestantism and the Pursuit oj
Wisdom: Must Technological Objectives Prevail?, in PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC
SCHOOLS 61 (D. Erickson ed. 1969).
36. 406 U.S. at 216.
37. WIs. STAT. § 118.15 (1969).
38. 406 U.S. at 219.
39. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. 406 U.S. at 221.
41. Id. at 222.
42. See note 34 supra.
43. 406 U.S. at 223.
44. Id. at 222.
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Finally, the Court concluded that the Amish introduced persuasive
evidence undermining the state's parens patriae argument45 and that
it would be inconsistent to accept the state's claim in light of the
Court's consistent emphasis on the central value underlying the Re-
ligious Clauses.
Adhering to the Sherbert requirement of an increased burden of
proof on the states 46 the Court felt it was incumbent on the state to
show with more particularity the adverse effect that the Amish ex-
emption would have on the state's strong interest in compulsory edu-
cation.47
Following precedent, the decision is a narrow one. The Court stated
in its holding that:
nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applica-
bility of the State's compulsory school attendance statutes or to
limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable standards
that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion, provide for
continuing agricultural vocational education under parental and
church guidance by the Old Order Amish or others similarly sit-
uated. .... 48
Thus, it can be seen that the Court was cautious not to open its doors
to a proverbial flood of litigation by good faith claims from other re-
ligious sects which are not unique sociologically as are the Amish.
In light of this decision, it is suggested that the Court, in future first
amendment cases, will apply the Sherbert9 balancing test in addition
to considering the historical development and success of the religious
order in question.
Rosezella E. Canty
45. Id. at 229-30. The state argued that a decision exempting Amish children from
the state's requirement fails to recognize the substantive rights of the Amish children to
an education beyond the eighth grade. This decision does not regard the state's parens
patriae power to give the benefit of an education beyond the eighth grade to Amish
children even if the state's act is contrary to the wishes of the children's parents. See
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
46. 374 U.S. at 404.
47. 406 U.S. at 236.
48. Id.
49. 374 U.S. at 403-04.
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